

115/23/37

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

18:52 (5666)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$622.54
--------------	---------------------	----------

FROM:	NEW YORK	C04656/NYK	22-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTV UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	BONN	Routine
	BRUSSELS	CANBERRA	Routine
	GENEVA	HARARE	Routine
	LONDON	MADRID	Routine
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
	PARIS	SANTIAGO	Routine
	TOKYO	WASHINGTON	Routine
	DEFENCE		Routine

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, CEO)
(DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your U/N fax (not to others).

Summary

- Security Council endorses French intervention in Rwanda by a vote of 10-0-5 (NZ, Nigeria, Brazil, Pakistan, China)
- The significant number of abstentions and the qualified support by the US and Russia will have demonstrated to the French that their actions in Rwanda are not widely supported
- The vote also sent a message that the non-Permanent Members will insist on having their views taken into better account in future Council decisions

Action

Information

Report

Res 929(1994) endorsing the French intervention in Rwanda was adopted early this afternoon by a vote of 10 - 0 - 5 (NZ, Nigeria, Brazil, Pakistan, China).

2 At the informals prior to the vote, Merimee attempted to

reply to the questions he left unanswered yesterday concerning the attitude of the RPF. He said that it would be presumptuous of France to expect the RPF to welcome the French intervention given their public position against any foreign intervention in Rwanda, including by the UN. But, they could expect the RPF to change its position after the resolution had been adopted. At his meetings this morning with Juppe and officials at the Quai, the Deputy Prime Minister designate under the Arusha Agreement had indicated that while he could not publicly support the intervention, he considered that French intentions were laudable and that the RPF would cooperate with the French once they made contact in Rwanda. Merimee said that French officials were also meeting the RPF today on the Rwanda/Uganda border. In addition, he pointed to yesterday's announcement by Canada that it would be providing 350 troops to UNAMIR as proof that the French intervention was not acting as a disincentive to participation in UNAMIR.

3 There were no public comments on this information. For the Brazilians, however, who had made RPF consent a keystone of their attitude to the resolution, Merimee's comments were insufficient to persuade them off their proposed abstention.

4 The only other discussion at the informals concerned the timing of the vote. The French were desperate for adoption by the early afternoon (and frequently checked their watches as time ticked away). Nigeria (Ayewah), however, tried to defer the vote until the afternoon, allegedly on the basis that his Minister was tied up in a meeting and had not confirmed his instructions. He also argued that the Council should wait to hear from OAU SecGen, Salim Salim who was arriving in New York in the early afternoon. But Ayewah ran into a major and unexpected obstacle in the person of Boutros Ghali.

5 In a move almost unprecedented in our time on the Council, the French had persuaded the SecGen to attend the final discussion of the text at the informals. When Ayewah argued for delay, the SecGen intervened to say that Council action was urgent and that he had had an urgent plea from his Special Rep in Burundi that something must be done quickly in Rwanda to stop the disease of the killings spreading to Burundi. Acknowledging the risks inherent in the French intervention, the SecGen also said that the dangers of intervention were less than those of Council inaction.

6 The SecGen's remarks gave sufficient basis for Spain, UK and Russia to argue in support of rapid action. France then proposed that the vote be held at 1pm. No one demurred. We took no part in the discussions at the informals. Merimee told us he was very grateful that New Zealand had not sought any further delay.

7 Russia, Brazil, Djibouti, China and Rwanda gave EOVs before the vote. France, US, NZ, Spain, UK, Czech Rep,

Argentina, Nigeria and Oman spoke afterwards. Pakistan kept its counsel.

8 Those supporting the resolution emphasised the need for rapid action to halt the killings in Rwanda, the difficulties in getting UNAMIR deployed, and the limited scope and timeframe of the French force. Probably the best case for the intervention was made by the US, though Mrs Albright's words comment that the nature of the humanitarian crisis demanded a swift response from the international community came oddly from the representative of the country most responsible for the delay in Council action on Rwanda. The US statement, however, was also the most pointed at the French motivation, insisting on the need for neutrality and implying that the world will be watching closely.

9 We have sent by separate fax (Wellington and Paris only) the text of the NZ EOJ which emphasised that while we shared and applauded France's humanitarian objectives, we disagreed with the means by which they were being pursued. As did Brazil and Nigeria, we expressed serious concerns about having two operations with different command structures and authorities operating in parallel, and noted the lessons that should have been drawn on this score from what happened in Somalia.

Comment

10 Paris's C01940 confirms our own impressions that the French had misread the level of support they had and were surprised when they learned this morning how many Council members intended to abstain. In fact, it could have been worse for them. Once the Argentines had found out where things stood, they made an effort to persuade Buenos Aires to move to an abstention as well. As it turned out, the Argentines continued to support the French, but had they not, the French would have been in the most uncomfortable situation of having the bare minimum of 9 positive votes (and reliant on that of Rwanda) to get the resolution through.

11 Merimee was clearly pleased at the tone of the New Zealand statement. He is also very well aware that the weight of New Zealand's independent viewpoint has been felt much more keenly by others in the Council. In fact, this is one of the few cases where we have had a difference with France. And on many other key policy issues - in particular, Bosnia and the use of air strikes, and the creation last year of UNAMIR - the French have had better cooperation from New Zealand than almost anyone else.

12 Like Paris, we do not think that the New Zealand abstention should do lasting damage to our relations with France. The number of abstentions, plus the fact that we were careful not to call into question French motives, should ensure that. We agree that our vote will not predispose the French to support future New Zealand initiatives on the

Council. But it is in the nature of things that they have many more initiatives in the Council than we do and will want our support for those, and they are already (with the British) our principal opponents in our endeavours to open up the Council's procedures.

13 The vote today will have sent a clear message to the French that their actions in Rwanda will be scrutinised closely and that, short of a dramatic change of circumstances, they will be held to their promises to keep their intervention truly impartial and of a short duration.

14 On a wider level, the vote will also have sent a timely signal to all the Permanent Members and the SecGen that the non-Permanent Council members are prepared to stand up for principle and that the consensus tradition of recent times cannot be used to coerce countries into supporting initiatives on which they have serious reservations. In that sense, we consider that the vote will be a help rather than a hindrance in ensuring that the views of all Council members are taken into account in future decisions.

End Message